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We point out a yet unnoticed flaw in Dutch Book arguments that relates to a
link  between  degrees  of  belief  and  betting  quotients.  We  offer  a  set  of
precise  conditions  governing  when  a  nonprobabilist  is  immune  to  the
classical  Dutch Book argument.  We suggest  that  diachronic  Dutch Book
arguments are also affected.
Suppose you decide that your first task on a sunny Tuesday morning is to convince your
friend who does not subscribe to probabilism (that is, he claims his degrees of belief need not be
classical  probabilities)  of  the  error  of  his  ways1.  You  decide  to  try  the  classical  Dutch  Book
argument first. To your surprise you discover that your friend is not worried about the somewhat
pragmatic nature of the argument, allows you to set all the stakes to 1 for convenience, and, while
claiming that the set of propositions about which he holds some degree of belief is finite, he is eager
to contemplate betting on virtually anything. He also considers a bet to be fair if its expected profit
both for the buyer and seller is null, and even accepts the package principle, that is, believes a set of
bets to be fair if each of the bets in that set is fair. Knowing all that, when telling your friend about
how  fair  betting  quotients  are  connected  with  the  Kolmogorov  axioms,  and  then  about  the
identification of fair betting quotients with degrees of belief, you expect him to be immediately
convinced.  To your  surprise  he  shakes  his  head in  opposition,  saying 'I  agree  that  fair  betting
quotients are exactly those which satisfy the axioms of classical probability. Still, even when we set
all stakes to 1, I don't believe that these quotients are my degrees of belief.'
'But Alan', you say, 'this is standard. We went through this. We agreed that if your degree of
* Apologies to all Readers for not having set this note in LaTeX. This because I submitted it to a journal which only
accepts very brief Word documents. Now that it's been promptly rejected, I am thinking of someday expanding it
into a full paper; still, introducing all notions properly and adding the philosophical context will take much work.
As it stands, the note assumes familiarity with the basic formal epistemology literature. I would be very grateful for
any remarks on the quality and clarity, or lack thereof. I can't believe I haven't found a paper on this, so it's probable
I'm making a fool of myself. If so, then maybe my mistakes will be instructive for someone!
1 Why Tuesday? See Hájek 2008.
belief in A is b(A), and your degree of belief in ~A is b(~A), then your betting quotient for the bet
for A is that particular q for which the expression
b(A)·(1-q)+b(~A)·(-q),
that is, the expected value of the bet, equals 0.  And it's a matter of mundane calculation that q is
exactly b(A). In general this means that betting quotients are your degrees of belief.'
'Still, look' – your friend responds – 'you're missing one thing. It's just that in my case b(A)
+b(~A) is in general not equal to 1. My degrees of belief are such that for each proposition A there
is a non-zero number r_A for which it holds that b(A)+b(~A)=r_A; some of those numbers may be
equal to 1, but none need be. And so my betting quotient for the bet for a proposition A is in general
b(A)/r_A. Can you run your argument using such quotients?'
Well, can you? It turns out that sometimes you can – but sometimes not. It all depends on the
particulars of your friend's belief state. In what follows I will specify the formal details. Notice that
the way the story is set up, our friend has granted you the assumptions needed to overcome the well
known flaws of the Dutch Book argument (discussed e.g. in Vineberg 2011 and Bradley 2015). Still,
it seems that even then he needs not be persuaded by the reasoning. This suggests that we have here
a new problem for Dutch Book arguments.
To reflect for a moment on the nature of the issue, notice that assuming that in general b(A)
+b(~A)=1 does not amount to assuming the probabilist thesis, that is, the problem is not that of pure
petitio principii. Still, by doing so we are assuming something with which a nonprobabilist may by
no means agree. We just know that by denying it, he has to hold that the additivity axiom or the
'normalization' axiom (stating that the probabilities of tautologies equals 1) is not satisfied by his
degrees of belief. 
We can arrive at the problem from another direction. The traditional way of looking at the
Dutch Book argument for probabilism would have it imply that possessing degrees of belief which
violate classical probability axioms is a mark of irrationality. This should be puzzling if we think
about  the  particular  form of  the  'normalization'  axiom used  in  the  classical  axiomatization  of
probability. If we believe tautologies to a degree different from 1, we can apparently be Dutch-
booked. Surely there's a mistake here: the choice of the number 1 as the probability of tautologies is
purely conventional. The number 2 (say) would do just as well. But if we are careful about setting
the betting quotients the way with which our nonprobabilistic friend would agree, then if his degree
of belief in countertautologies is 0 and his degree of belief in tautologies is 2, his betting quotient
for tautologies is 1, exactly the same as in the classical case.
Let us continue towards the theorem specifying the class of cases in which a nonprobabilist
is not Dutch-bookable. A belief space is a tuple (W,Prop,b), where W is a nonempty finite set, Prop
is a Boolean algebra of subsets of  W ('propositions'), and  b is a function from  Prop  to the real
numbers, called the belief function. We will write T for the tautological proposition W and F for the
countertautological proposition, that is for the empty set. We will say that a function b from Prop to
the real numbers is a classical probability function iff it satisfies the following three axioms:
(1) b(T)=1 (the normalization axiom);
(2) for any A in Prop b(A) ≥ 0;
(3) for any A and B whose intersection is empty b(A v B)=b(A)+b(B).
Notice that as mentioned above, (1) and (3) imply that for any A in Prop b(A)+b(~A)=1, that
is, they imply the assumption we need for the 'classical' connection between degrees of belief and
betting quotients. In our case we wish to play by our friend's rules, that is, for any A, we want to set
the betting quotient for A to b(A)/(b(A)+b(~A)): this way we will make sure that according to our
friend the expected value of the bet for  A is 0 (remember that all the stakes are set to 1; nothing
important in the argument depends on this). We will say a belief space  B=(W,Prop,b) induces a
betting quotient function q from Prop to the reals (which may turn out to be a classical probability
function, but may not) if
(B1) for any A in Prop b(A)+b(~A) is not equal to 0;
(B2) for any A in Prop q(A)=b(A)/(b(A)+b(~A)).
It follows that if a belief space induces a betting quotient function, that is, if (B1) holds, then
that function is unique. For a belief space of a probabilist, the induced betting quotient function q
just the original degree of belief function b. We can state the classical Dutch Book theorem (see for
example Kemeny 1955 and Lehman 1955) as follows: a belief space (B,W,b) is not Dutch-bookable
if and only if the betting quotient function induced by it is a classical probability function. The
question is now: which belief spaces induce such betting quotient functions? The answer lies in the
following simple theorem. In its formulation we refer by 'At' to the set of atomic propositions of a
given belief space (B,W,b); they are minimally small nonempty subsets of W, which exist since W is
finite.
Theorem.  Suppose a  belief  space  (B,W,b) induces  a  betting  quotient  function  q.  q is  a
classical probability function if and only if the following conditions are true:
(Q1) b(F)=0;
(Q2) for any A in Prop, if b(A) and b(~A) are both not equal to 0, then they have the same
sign;
(Q3) for any nonempty A in Prop not equal to T, b(A) =  Σ_{B ε At: B ε A} b(B).
Proof sketch. (1) is equivalent to (Q1). (2) is equivalent to (Q2). To show that (Q1) together
with  (Q3)  imply  (3),  in  the  context  of  the  assumption  of  (B,W,b) inducing  a  betting  quotient
function, we proceed by cases. Case 1: both A and B are equal to F. (3) follows from from (Q1).
Case 2: A is equal to T and B is equal to F. (3) follows from (Q1) and the assumption that (B,W,b)
induces a betting quotient function, since from that it follows that b(A) is different from 0. Case 3:
None of {A,B} is equal to any of {T,F}. In that case using (Q3) we can quickly show that q(A)+q(B)
= q(A v B). The last thing to notice is that (3) implies (Q3), since  q(A) = q(UB |  B ε At: B ε A}
(where U is the set-theoretical union), to which (3) is applicable since our structures are finite. □
Notice that (Q3), saying that the degree of belief in a non-tautological proposition is equal to
the sum of the degrees of belief  in atomic propositions which imply it,  is  strictly  weaker than
additivity of b. If we agree with the convention that the sum over an empty set is 0, we could omit
(Q1) and the word 'nonempty' from (Q3).
It follows immediately from the above Theorem that if your belief space is a measure space
with the total measure being different from 1 – that is, not a  probability space – you will not be
Dutch-bookable.  But  there  are  different  cases.  For  a  non-Dutch  Bookable  belief  space  which
violates all three classical probability axioms, take B=(W,Prop,b) with W={1,2},  Prop = {T,F,{1},
{2}}, and b defined as follows: b(F)=0, b({1})=-1/3=b({2}), b(T)=-1. Notice that the induced betting
quotient function  q is a classical probability function:  q(F)=0,  q({1})=1/2=q({2}),  q(T)=1, so the
belief space is not Dutch-bookable. By simple transformations of B one will quickly find examples
of non-Dutch-bookable belief spaces which violate other combinations of the classical probability
axioms.2
All this should not suggest that a nonprobabilist is rational; it shows that if we proceed with
the Dutch Book argument in the way that is fair to our nonprobabilistic interlocutor, that is, if we do
not impute our way of calculating the expected value of a bet on him, it may turn out that he is
actually not susceptible to a Dutch Book. But this does not mean that a nonprobabilist is always
safe, and the above Theorem provides a recipe for presenting a belief space which will be Dutch
Bookable. Consider for example B'=(W',Prop',b') with W'={1,2,3}, Prop' being the power set of W'
and  b' defined as follows:  b'(F)=0,  b'(X)=1/3 if  X is a singleton,  b'(Y)=1/2 if  Y is a doubleton,
b'(T)=1. We see that b' violates additivity. Notice that if q' is the induced betting quotient function,
q'({1})=q'({2})=2/5,  but  q'({1,2})=3/5.  This means that  q',  violating additivity,  is  not a classical
2 Looking at the Theorem again, it would seem that to arrive at a non-Dutch-bookable belief space one has to take a
classical probability space, multiply all degrees of belief apart from the one in T by the same non-zero real number
(possibly negative), and then put in an arbitrary non-zero degree of belief in T. If this is correct, then I owe this
observation to Joanna Luc.
probability function,  so by the above Theorem and the classical  results  mentioned earlier  B' is
Dutch-bookable.
There are of course belief spaces (W,Prop,b) which do not induce a betting quotient function
because for some proposition A b(A)+b(~A) equals 0. In that case we could define a partial betting
quotient function in the obvious way, which would lead us to some examples of Dutch Books
without  the need to  figure out  what  the  subject's  betting  quotient  for  A should  be.  A different
direction would be to propose in such cases a different method for calculating betting quotients; one
option is to bite the bullet and say that such a subject should accept any price for bets for A and for
~A (since for any price he will calculate the expected value of the bet as 0), which will of course
make him instantly Dutch-bookable.
A similar line of argument can be offered to the effect that a nonprobabilist may avoid the
classical diachronic Dutch Book argument for conditionalization (succintly presented e.g. in Briggs
2009).3 That is to say, the particular way of arguing for conditionalization which goes back to D.
Lewis and P. Teller sometimes, but not always, fails. We leave the details, which are too lengthy to
include in a short paper like this one, to the Reader.  We have not ruled out that other diachronic
Dutch Book arguments for conditionalization may exist which would be fully nonprobabilist-proof.
In conclusion: even if we forget about all the problems of Dutch Book arguments which are
usually mentioned in the formal epistemology literature, it turns out that another one lurks in the
basic step of connecting degrees of belief with betting quotients. I have specified the class of belief
spaces which, while nonprobabilistic, is not susceptible to a Dutch Book if we try to avoid that
problem. We can expect a similar situation with arguments based on scoring rules – but this is a
topic for a longer paper.
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